We extend the Church encoding of the Booleans and two-valued Boolean Logic in λ-calculus to encodings of n-valued sequential propositional logic (for 3 ≤ n ≤ 5) in well-chosen infinitary extensions in λ-calculus. In case of three-valued logic we use the infinitary extension of the finite lambda calculus in which all terms have a unique normal form in which their Böhm tree can be recognised. The construction can be refined for n ∈ {4, 5}.
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Motivation and overview
In this paper we will extend the well-known Church encoding of Boolean logic into λ-calculus to an encoding of three-valued logic into a suitable infinitary extension of λ-calculus that identifies all unsolvables by ⊥. By way of motivation we consider Russell's paradox.
Russell's Paradox
This paradox arises if we, somewhat naïvely, consider the set R of all sets that are not a member of themselves and then wonder whether R ∈ R. We get as paradoxical consequence that R ∈ R if and only if R / ∈ R. At the heart of this paradox lies a λ-term (the application pp is interpreted as p p) P ≡ (λp.¬(pp))(λp.¬(pp)) with the following infinite reduction P → ¬P → ¬¬P → ¬¬¬P → . . .
The limit ¬(¬(¬(. . .))) of this reduction is an infinite proposition. Unexpected, perhaps, but not necessarily paradoxical.
In the past [19, 30] we have developed a family of infinitary λ-calculi, each depending on a set of meaningless terms. The set US of unsolvable λ-terms is a prominent example. The corresponding infinitary extension λ ∞ β⊥ U S of the finite λ-calculus λ β is corresponding and normalising for a suitable notion of possibly infinite reduction. The normal forms of the finite λ-terms correspond with their Böhm trees. The Böhm trees of the unsolvables are ⊥.
So with this in mind, we are no longer afraid of infinite terms. The Church encoding of a finite λ-term results in a finite λ-term and the encoding of an infinite term, like the one above, just results in an infinite λ-term. Looking careful at the encoding of the finite and infinite closed propositions we realise that these are either unsolvable or the finite encoding of one of the Booleans.
Encoding three-valued logic in infinitary λ-calculus
Thus we are led to extend the Church encoding to an encoding of three-valued logic in infinitary λ-calculus λ ∞ β⊥ U S , by mapping the third value to ⊥. Inspection of the truth tables then reveals that the Church encoding of Boolean logic now has naturally been extended to a Church encoding of McCarthy's three-valued logic. In particular we find that the infinite term ¬(¬(¬(. . .))) that we encountered in our analysis of Russell's paradox is nether true or false but ⊥.
Encoding four-and five-valued logic
We will further note that the set of unsolvable λ-terms that gets identified by ⊥ can be split in three subsets closed under infinite reduction and substitution. Repeating the above construction now with three new truth values we find that the Church encoding also encodes a five-valued McCarthy-an logic. The four-valued sub-logic has been described earlier by Bergstra e.a. The five-valued logic shares aspects with, but is different from a five-valued logic defined by Bergstra and Ponse.
A speculation about Church
When Church started his work on λ-calculus (at least in 1928, likely earlier, given that his thesis was ready in 1926 and given his review [9] of Volume 2 and 3 of Principia Mathematica [32] , his motivation was to use the λ-calculus as the basis for a logic that could serve as the foundation of mathematics [11] . Church's hope was that by using non-classical logic (in which he had shown an earlier interest [10] ) he could side step the Paradoxes without have to introduce Zermelo's set axioms or Russell's type theory, that he both judged as somewhat artificial. He discovered with his students Kleene and Rosser that the lambda definable function corresponded exactly with the recursive functions [22, 23, 14] . But in the build-up to that result Kleene and Rosser managed to prove the inconsistency of Church's logical system [24] while he himself was still publicly hopeful that his system could be paradox free [12] . A disaster. Fortunately, the λ-calculus itself was consistent by the Church-Rosser theorem [16] . Various papers under preparation had to be rewritten. Church rebounded almost immediately with his formulation of the Church-Turing thesis [14] and his negative solution of Hilbert's Entscheidungsproblem [13] (there is no algorithm that can decide whether a given formula of the first order arithmetic is provable or not).
So 
Preliminaries
We will recall notation, concepts and facts from infinitary λ-calculus, while assuming familiarity with λ β , by which we denote the finite λ-calculus with β-reduction and no η-reduction [15, 4] . We will use → and → → for respectively one step β-reduction and finite step β-reduction. We will use ≡ to indicate syntactical identity. We will use the following special terms.
Finite reduction in λ β is confluent but not normalising. A finite term like Θx has an infinite reduction
This is a converging reduction (think of terms as trees and take the standard metric on trees) with an infinite term as limit:
We can add infinite λ-terms to the finite λ-terms by reading the usual syntax definition (where x ranges over some countable set of variables) of finite λ-terms coinductively:
We will write Λ ∞ for this set of finite and infinite λ-terms. Using → → → for a possibly infinite converging reduction, we can now write
Later in the paper we will encounter the infinite term λyλyλy . . ., which is the limit of the converging reduction
Hence some finite terms without a finite normal form now have converging reductions to a possibly infinite normal form. We have don't have confluence for finite and converging reductions. The finite term (λx.I(xx))(λx.I(xx)) has a finite reduction to Ω and an infinite converging reduction to III . . .. Both reducts have the property that they can only reduce to themselves. Hence they can not joined by either finite or converging reductions.
It is possible to build many different infinitary extensions of λβ which are confluent and normalising for finite and convergent reductions and finite and infinite terms [20, 21, 19, 30] . We need to do three things. First, we choose a set U of finite lambda terms. Second, we add a new symbol ⊥ U to the syntax of lambda terms and consider the set Λ ∞ ⊥ of finite and infinite terms over the extended coinductive syntax. Third, we add a new reduction ⊥ U -rule on Λ ∞ ⊥ that will allow us to identify the terms of U by the new symbol ⊥ U . We apply this rule as follows. This rule works on terms of the form C[M ] ∈ Λ ∞ ⊥ ,as follows: whenever
we may reduce as follows
For a given U we denote this infinite extension by λ
. In a series of papers [20, 21, 19, 30] we have determined a necessary and sufficient collection of Axioms that the set U must satisfy in order for λ ∞ β⊥ U to a converging and normalising infinite λ-calculus. We call such sets meaningless sets. The choice of a meaningless set U is akin the choice of a semantics for lambda calculus: the normal forms in λ ∞ β⊥ U together form a model of the λ-calculus. The intuition is that the elements of a meaningless sets are undefined/ have no meaning/ are insignificant. In order for this model to be consistent, U has to be a proper subset of Λ ∞ . Here is the list of axioms:
Definition 2.1 ([30] ). U ⊆ Λ ∞ is called a set of (finite or infinite) meaningless terms, if it satisfies the axioms of meaninglessness:
3. Axiom of Closure under Substitution: If M ∈ U then any substitution instance of M is an element of U. 4. Axiom of (Weak) Overlap: Either for each λx.P ∈ U, there is some W ∈ U such that
This construction we were inspired by the definition of Böhm tree [4] . If one takes for U the set US of unsolvables [1] The smallest meaningless set [20, 5] is the set R of terms that are root active (also called mute or top terminating). A lambda term M is root active if any reduct of M can further reduce to a redex. The classical root active term is Ω. The unsolvable ΩI is not root active. Note that the definition of a root active terms allows for free variables. The normal forms in λ ∞ β⊥ R of the Berarducci tree of M . The Lévy-Longo trees can be obtained if one performs this construction over the set of terms without a weak head normal form. In general there are more than uncountably many meaningless sets [30] The collection of normal forms of each such λ ∞ β⊥ U is a model of the lambda calculus λ β . The axioms are chosen such that different sets give rise to different, consistent models.
Church considered the terms without finite normal form as insignificant [15, 4] . But the set of such terms is not a meaningless set [21, 19] . This may have been the implicit reason behind Church's choice to work with the λI-calculus instead of λK-calculus, that we have denoted by λ β . We will return to this in Section 4.
Encoding many-valued logic in λ-calculus
In this section we will extend the familiar Church encoding of Boolean logic to many-valid logic using ideas from Böhm trees and infinitary λ-calculus. Precise references to the Church encoding we don't know. As Landin suggests in [26] :
In particular Church and Curry, and McCarthy and the ALGOL 60 authors, are so large a part of the history of their respective disciplines as to make detailed attributions inevitably incomplete and probably impertinent.
Encoding Boolean logic in λ-calculus
In "the History of Lisp" [29] John McCarthy mentions his "invention of the true conditional expression [if M then N 1 else N 2 ] which evaluates only one of N l and N 2 according to whether M is true or false" and also his "desire for a programming language that would allow its use" in the period 1957-8. He also recalls "the conditional expression interpretation of Boolean connectives" as one of the characterising ideas of LISP. By this he means concretely the if-then-else construct (when applied to Boolean expressions only) in combination with the truth values T and F can be used as a basis for propositional logic [28] with the following natural definitions:
Barendregt's book [4] records two elegant encodings of the Booleans and the if-then-else construct. One encodes into the classical λ-calculus and the other into the more restricted λI-calculus preferred by Church [11, 15] . The latter we will discuss in Section 4. The former is the simplest:
It is easy to see that if-then-else behaves as intended in this encoding. When B reduces to T and F, we have respectively:
With help of (2) it is straightforward to verify that the standard truth tables of Figure 1 for Boolean valued propositional logic hold in λ-calculus. Boolean logic commonly deals with
finite propositions. The set of finite propositions can be defined formally with a inductive syntax, where p ranges over some possibly infinite set of proposition letters:
It is not hard to prove by induction that all closed finite propositions have a unique finite normal form:
Lemma 3.1. Let φ be a finite closed proposition. Then φ has a unique finite normal form, which is either T or F.
Encoding infinitary propositions in Infinitary λ-Calculus
Infinite propositions can be of use too. They can be used to model certain while statements like while ¬a test b [6] which is the infinite solution of the recursive equation
W = if a then T else if b then W else W
By reading the syntax definition (3) coinductively we obtain the set of finite or infinite propositions.
In the introduction we showed how Russell's paradox leads to the infinite proposition ¬ (¬(¬(. . .) 
)). The encoding of this infinite proposition ¬¬¬ . . . in λ-calculus is the infinite term (((. . .)FT)FT)FT
which happens to be an infinite left spine.
Not all infinite propositions reduce to infinite left spines: for instance, the infinite proposition
is root active. And some of infinite propositions reduce just to T or F: for instance, the term
These examples show that some infinite propositions reduce to a Boolean, but not all do. The latter have in common that their Böhm tree is ⊥.
Theorem 3.2. Let φ be a finite or infinite closed proposition. Then the Böhm tree of φ is either T, F or ⊥.
Proof. By coinduction!
The missing detail in the above proof follows from the corollary of the next lemma: 
Proof. Eg., B(¬⊥) = B(¬U ) = B(U FT) = ⊥
Encoding three-valued McCarthy logic with help of Böhm trees
¬ T F F T ⊥ ⊥ ∧ T F ⊥ T T F ⊥ F F F F ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ∨ T F ⊥ T T T T F T F ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ → T F ⊥ T T F ⊥ F T T T ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥
Figure 2 McCarthy's three-valued sequential three-valued propositional logic
McCarthy discovered three valued-sequential propositional logic in his search for a suitable formalism for a mathematical theory of computation [27, 28] . In the context of some language for computational (partial) functions he introduced conditional expressions of the form
where the p i are propositional expressions that evaluate to true or false. The idea is that the value of the whole conditional expression is the value of the expression e i for the first p i with value true. If all p i have value false than the conditional expression is undefined. To allow that the evaluation of an expression can be inconclusive, McCarthy stated the rule to evaluate such conditional expression more precisely:
If an undefined p occurs before a true p or if all p's are false or if the e corresponding to the first true p is undefined, the value of the conditional expression is the value of the e corresponding to the first true p. Now the propositional connectives can be defined with help of as conditional expressions. (4) for which McCarthy then derives the very same truth tables of Figure 2 .
Guzman and Squier [18] have given a complete axiomatisation of McCarthy's logic, cf. Figure 3 . 
Proof. After applying the definitions of the logical operators it remains to show that
The argument now is by inspection. B 0 = T. Then Txy = x. Hence it is sufficient to show that B 1 = B 1 B 1 F. This follows by inspection of the three options for B 1 ∈ {T, ⊥, F}.
Then it is enough to show that F = FFB 2 , which follows by inspection of the three options for B 2 ∈ {T, ⊥, F}.
Refining the encoding from three-valued to five-valued logic
In the previous section we identified the unsolvable λ-terms with the third truth value ⊥ by taking their Böhm trees, their (possibly infinite) normal form in the infinitary λ-calculus λ
. We can refine this idea by using the observation of [31] that the set of unsolvables is the union of three pairwise disjoint sets. Each of these sets gives rise to its own truth value. These three sets are defined as follows. 
IL
The three sets can be characterised alternatively using the notion of Berarducci tree. Berarducci tree can show more detail of a term than Böhm trees do. equality on λ-terms then the Böhm trees do. This allows us to refine the truth value ⊥ of the previous section into three different truth values. 
M ∈ O if and only if the Berarducci tree of
The set HA is a set of meaningless terms, the other two sets are almost sets of meaningless terms. Apart from the axiom of root activeness IL and O satisfy all other axioms of meaninglessness. This allows us to refine the notion of Böhm reduction. Instead of replacing unsolvable λ-terms by ⊥ we will now replace the elements in HA, IL and O by respectively, the constants ⊥ HA , ⊥ IL and ⊥ O , so that instead of one ⊥-reduction → ⊥ we have now three reduction rules, called → ⊥ HA , → ⊥ IL and → ⊥ O . Proof. This follows from Lemma 3.7 and the facts from [20] that λ ∞ β⊥ R is confluent and normalising, and ⊥ R -reduction can be postponed over β-reduction.
We will now encode logic in λ-calculus using the same logical operators as before together with now five truth values from {T, F, ⊥ HA , ⊥ IL , ⊥ O }. We need an analogue of Corollary 3.4. 
Another encoding of the Booleans
Barendregt gave in fact two encodings for the Booleans in his book [4] . Besides the previous common encoding of the Booleans he also defined an encoding of the Booleans in the spirit of Church, because the new encodings of the Booleans are terms in the λI-calculus.
In this case we can not derive (2). Instead we get
Yet by inspection of each of the four concrete options for M, N ∈ {T, F} we find that
Combining (6) with (7) gives us (2) for all Booleans M, N . Hence also this lesser known encoding validates the truth tables of Boolean propositional logic.
Böhm trees in the λI-calculus
Church strongly preferred the λI-calculus over the unrestricted λ-calculus. For him the natural notion of meaning of a λ-term is its finite normal form, provided it exist. Terms without finite normal form are meaningless or, to use his own wording, insignificant [15] . [25] have shown that the unsolvable terms in the λI-calculus are precisely the terms without finite normal form. They did not consider the Böhm tree construction which simplifies enormously for λI-calculus. We don't have to consider infinite terms and infinite reductions. We just add the rule M → ⊥ ⊥, whenever M has no finite normal form.
Let us denote the λI-calculus extended with this rule λI β⊥ . This extension is confluent and normalising in the finitary sense, and the Böhm tree of any λI-term either equals ⊥ or is a finite ⊥-free normal form. In the past we have overlooked this construction, as the set of λI-terms is not closed under reduction. In the limit a bound variable may "drop off". In the context of the ⊥-rule this is no problem because such terms reduce in one step to ⊥. There is no need to consider infinite reduction as any finite λI-term has a finite Böhm tree. 
Conclusion
The idea to solve Russell's paradox with three-valued logic is not at all new. Feferman gives various pointers in [17] . But the conjunctions and disjunctions of the three-valued logics that are usually considered for that purpose all seem to be commutative in contrast to those in the left-sequential McCarthy logic that we use here. It is possible to refine the encoding further to make an encoding of ω-valued logic along these lines in lambda calculus. The new truth values then correspond to the different shapes of left spine that unsolvables can have. We see no further use for that.
